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REFUNDS AND RECOVERY OF STATE TAXES ERRONEOUSLY, ILLEGALLY, OR UNCONSTITUTIONALLY
IMPOSED IN WEST VIRGINIA
BERNARD SCLOVE0

Since the adoption of the amendment to the state constitution
limiting the rates of taxation on propertyI citizens of West Virginia have witnessed the reshaping of their entire system of taxation. In the course of this revolutionary process, legislators and
other public officials have directed their attention primarily to ferreting out increased revenue, the need was so acute. Out of this
search have come higher rates for existing license taxes on businesses, occupations and privileges, 2 a chain store tax,3 a consumers'
sales tax,4 a non-intoxicating beer tax,5 and a personal gross in7
come tax" recently superseded by a personal net income tax.
These are prominent features of the finally evolved system, although practically every existing tax law has undergone change in
some manner.
Many facets of this new taxation system already have been
subjected to scrutiny by both state and federal courts; in some instances the question of constitutionality has been threshed out as
well as the question of interpretation and proper application of
the law.8 It is a fair assumption that there will be considerably
more litigation involving delicate adjustments in the application
of these laws to particular situations. The new personal net in* Member of the Bar, Charleston, West Virginia. The writer has been
greatly assisted by the brief for the Standard Oil Company in Standard Oil
Co. v. Fox, infra n. 8, in the preparation of which he participated.
I-V. VA. CONST., art. X, § 1, as amended in November, 1932.
2 E. g., increased taxes and surtaxes on businesses, occupations, and privileges, W. VA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1932) e. 11, art. 12A, §§ 2-5, and art. 13, § 2,
as amended W. Va. Acts 1st Extra. Sess. 1933, c. 33 (Michie, Supp. 1933, c.
11, art. 12A, §§ 2-5, and art. 13, § 2), as further amended W. Va. Acts 1935,
S. B. No. 211, art. 1, §§ 3, 4, and S. B. No. 283; special license fees on public
utilities, W. VA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1932) c. 24, art. 3, § 6, as amended W.
Va. Acts 1935, S. B. No. 146.
3W. VA. CODE ANN. (Michie, Supp. 1933), c. 11, art. 13A.
4 W. VA. CODE ANN. (Michie, Supp. 1934) c. 11, art. 15, Title II, as continued by W. Va. Acts 1935, S. B. No. 211, art. II.
5 W. VA. CODE ANN. (Michie, Supp. 1933) e. 11, art. 12, §§ 91-101.
6 W. VA. CODE ANN. (Michie, Supp. 1933) e. 11, art. 13, § 2-i.
7W. Va. Acts 1935, 1I. B. No. 441.
8 Fox v. Standard Oil Co., 79 L. ed. 339 (1935), rev'g, Standard Oil Co. v.
Fox, 6 F. Supp. 494 (S. D. W. Va. 1934) (chain store tax); Laing v. Fox, 175
S. E. 354 (W. Va. 1934), appeaZ dismissed, 79 L. ed. 111 (gross
income tax); Streckfus Steamers, Inc. v. Fox, Case No. 3404, in Admiralty
now pending before United States District Court for Southern District of
West Virginia (attack on validity of gross sales tax and consumers' sales tax
laws as applied to excursion steamers).
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come tax law would seem especially to present possibilities for such
litigation, if the experience under the federal income tax law is
any criterion. A timely field of inquiry involves a determination
of what channels are open to West Virginia taxpayers for obtaining refunds or recovering excessive tax payments, 9 particularly
in the usual situation where the money is no longer in the hands
of the collecting officer but has been turned over to the state
treasury as required by specific provision in the various tax statutes.10 Naturally, the legislature has not given the matter of tax
refunds and recovery the same comprehensive and intensive treatment that was involved in providing new sources for revenue.
9 For general reading on the subject see the following: Field, The Recovery
of Illegal and Unconstitutional Taxes (1932) 45 HAnV. L. REv. 501; Field,
Unconstitutional Statutes and Public Officers (1928) 77 U. OF PA. L. REV.
155; Lockwood, Maw and Rosenberry, Injunction in Constitutional Litigation
(1930) 43 HI.Av. L. REv. 426; State Statutes and the .Federal Equity Courts
(1932) 32 COL. L. REv. 688; Perkins, Tax Injunctions and Suits to Recover
Taxes Paid under Protest in North Carolina (1933) 12 N. C. L. REV. 20.
10 The following general provision is found in W. VA. CODE ANN. (Michie,
1932) c. 12, art. 2, § 2: 1 All officials and employees of the State shall promptly
deposit with the state treasurer all moneys received or collected by them for
or on behalf of the state for any purpose whatsoever ..... The gross amount
collected in all cases shall be paid into the state treasury, and commissions.
costs and expenses. of collection authorized by general law to be paid out of
the gross collection are hereby authorized to be paid out of the moneys collected
and paid into the state treasury in the same manner as other payments are
made from the state treasury." Practically every tax law requires payment of
all collections thereunder into the state treasury without any qualification as to
taxes erroneously collected or paid under protest: W. VA. CODE ANN. (Michie,
1932) c. 11, art. 9, § 27 (property taxes collected by sheriff), ibid. c. 11, art.
6, § 21 (property assessments against public service corporations); ibid.
(Michie, Supp. 1933) c. 11, art. 11, §§ 1, 20, 28 (inheritance, transfer and net
estate taxes); ibid. (Michie, 1932) c. 11, art. 12, § 32 (taxes on state licenses
collected by sheriff or other collector); ibid. (Michie, 1932) c. 11, art. 12, §§
70, 72 (charter tax on domestic corporations and license tax on foreign corporations collected by secretary of state and auditor); ibid. (Michie, Supp. 1933)
c. 11, art. 12, § 101 (non-intoxicating beer tax collected by tax commissioner
required to be paid to treasurer and credited to state fund, general revenue);
ibid. (Michie, Supp. 1933) c.11, art. 12A (statute imposing privilege tax on
certain carrier corporations makes no provision for proceeds of collections by
tax commissioner, but W. Va. Acts 1935, S. B. No. 211, art. 1, § 9 provides as
to the emergency surtax on such corporations that the proceeds be paid into
the state fund, general revenue); ibid. (Michie, Supp. 1933) c. 11, art. 13,
§ 11 (business and occupation tax collections, including personal gross income
collections, payable by tax commissioner into state treasury, and W. Va. Acts
1935, S.B. No. 211, art. 1, § 9 makes similar provision as to emergency surtax) ;
ibid. (Michie, Supp. 1933) c. 11, art. 13A, § 10 (all money collected by tax
commissioner under chain store tax payable monthly into state treasury, less
expenses of administration); ibid. (Michie, 1932) c. 11, art. 14, § 22 (gasoline
taxes and license fees collected by tax commissioner all payable into state treasury); ibid. (Michie, Supp. 1934) c. 11, art. 15, § 22, reenacted and continued
by W. Va. Acts 1935, S.B. No. 211, art. I, § 22 (provisions that proceeds
from consumers' sales tax shall be devoted to support of free schools, and be
expended in such manner as may be provided by law presumably ii:teads pay-
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An aggrieved taxpayer must look either to the public
treasury or to the collecting officer for reimbursement. The personal assets' of the officer may be insufficient to satisfy the demand
against him. As for reaching the treasury, the organic law may
present a formidable barrier. The West Virginia constitution provides that the state "shall never be made defendant in any court
of law or equity." 11 This type of provision is found today in only
a handful of American states. 2 Literally, it is an absolute prohibition against judicial controversy involving the interest or property of the state, not even countenancing the consent of the state
to be sued.'3 Under many constitutional provisions the legislature may waive the immunity and grant such consent.' 4 Apparment over to treasury by tax commissioner); W. Va. Acts 1935, S. B. No. 140
(special license fees on public utilities to be paid by auditor into state treasury
and kept as special "Public Service Commission Fund"); W. Va. Acts 1935,
H. B. No. 441, § 59, (under personal net income tax law tax commissioner
required to pay all taxes, fees, interest and penalties collected into the state
treasury.)
11 W. VA.CONST., art. VI, § 35.
1 ILL. CoNsT. (1870) art. IV, § 26; ALA. CONST. (1901) art. 1, § 14 of the
Bill of Rights; AnK. CoNsT., art. V. § 20. The Illinois and Alabama provisions
are identical with our own; the Arkansas provision is similar. The present
Alabama provision first appeared in the Constitution of 1875. It seems to have
been substituted for section 16 of the Bill of Rights of the Constitution of
1868 which provided the opposite nile: "That suits may be brought against
the state in such manner and in such courts as may be by law provided.II
1' Where the prohibition against suit is couched in imperative, absolute form
there would seem to be no room for argument that the immunity can be waived
by the legislature. For this view that the immuity is absolute see Arkansas
State Highway Commission v. Dodge, 181 Ark. 539, 26 S. W. (2d) 879, 881
(1930); Ex parte MacDonald, 76 Ala. 603, 605 (1884) (apart from any constitutional inhibition on the subject, the state would not be liable to ordinary
suit, except by its own consent, usually expressed by statute); Alabama Girls'
Industrial School v. Reynolds, 143 Ala. 579, 42 So. 114, 116 (1904) (statutory
authorization void under existing constitutional prohibition); Alabama Industrial School v. Adler, 144 Ala. 553, 42 So. 116, 117 (1905) (the legislature is
incompetent to give consent and waive the immunity; Miller Supply Co. v.
Board of Control, 72 W. Va. 524, 78 S.E. 672 (1913) (action not maintainable
even though the statute creating the board authorized it to sue and be sued);
Gordon v. Board of Control, 85 W. Va. 739, 741, 102 S. E. 688 (1920) (same
holding); Mahone v. Road Commission, 99 W. Va. 397, 129 S. E. 320 (1925)
(same holding as to road commission likewise empowered to sue and be sued).
Yet, singularly enough, in People v. Sanitary District, 210 Ill. 171, 71 N. E.
334 (1904), in holding that the attorney-general of Illinois could not waive the
state's immunity, the court said in one and the same breath that "in this section of the constitution the fiat of the people, the supreme authority of the
state, is so positive and clear that it requires only to be read to produce upon
the mind the conviction that the inhibition therein contained is absolute," and
that "we are not called upon to determine whether the legislature under our
constitution, could waive the exemption, or authorize a suit or proceeding to
be brought against the State, as it has not attempted to do so in the case before
us."
14 Unless there is a constitutional provision rendering the rule otherwise, a
state's immunity from suit may be waived by the proper authority. See cases

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1935

3

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 41, Iss. 4 [1935], Art. 4
WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY

351.

ently, the prohibition has no application to statutes authorizing
an administrative determination of a claim for refund,15 and depending on legislative provision for payment by appropriation,
except that even there the process of a court cannot be invoked to
compel or control such determination.le The prohibition applies
whenever the interest of the state is immediate and direct, notwithstanding the fact that the state may not be the formal party
upon the record.17 In an analogous situation, arising under the
Eleventh Amendment to the federal Constitution, it is settled doctrine that a suit will lie against a person to recover possession of
specific property, doubtless including specific moneys paid on
account of taxes, although the defendant claims to have possession
as an officer of the state, and not otherwise.' s But once tax moneys
reach the treasury, the state no longer stands aside as a disinterested party. Public funds are not subject to the process of a
court, and the return of the money rests solely in the grace of the
legislature. Any action "in a court of law or equity" against the
tax commissioner, or any other state officer such as the auditor or
treasurer, in his official capacity, for a judgment to be satisfied
from the public funds in the state treasury strikes at the very
cited in 59 C. J. § 459. In many states the constitution provides that the legislature shall direct a method by which citizens having claims against it may
sue the state. Under a few state constitutions, the supreme court of the state
has jurisdiction to entertain claims against the state, but its decisions are
merely advisory. In others a board is created to audit claims. STimsox, FEnEPAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES (1908) 151; 3 CooLEY,
TAXATION (4th ed. 1924) § 1276, pp. 2551-2; W. VA. CODE ANN. (Miebie, 1932)
c. 14, art. 2, §§ 1-5, provides a statutory proceeding for auditing pecuniary
claims against the state by petition to the Circuit Court of Kanawha County
which must be reported to the legislature thereafter and cannot be paid until
an appropriation therefor is made. This has been held not to be a civil case
reviewable by writ of error. Robinson v. LaFollette, 46 W. Va. 565, 33 S. E.
288 (1899).
1GThe statement in the text is based on what seems to be the force and effect
of the decision in Robinson v. LaFollette, supra n. 13.
16 Where judgment and discretion are involved, suits against state officials
or boards are within the prohibition of the constitution. Fidelity, etc., Co. v.
Shaid, 103 W. Va. 432, 438, 137 S. E. 878 (1927), and cases cited therein.
Mandamus will not lie against the auditor to control the exercise of his discretion in passing upon pecuniary claims against the state. Robinson v. LaFollette, supra, n. 13. But where a specific appropriation already has been made
by the legislature, the constitutionality of which appropriation is challenged
by the auditor, a mandamus can be had to enforce the payment of the claim.
Woodall v. Darst, 71 W. Va. 350, 77 S. E. 264 (1912).
'17Coal R. Co. v. Conley, 67 W. Va. 129, 67 S. E. 613 (1910).
18 Tindal v. Wesley, 167 U. S. 204, 221, 17 S. Ct. 770 (1896);

Smith v.

Reeves, 178 U. S. 436, 438-9, 20 S. Ct. 919 (1900), aff'g, 87 Fed. 964 (C. C.
A. 9th, 1898).
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heart of the constitutional prohibition and is barred.1 9 The West
Virginia supreme court has recently stated the pertinent principle thus: "Immunity is peculiarly applicable where financial
liability is sought to be fastened on the state through some branch
of its government. "20
The West Virginia constitution also provides that "no money
shall be drawn from the treasury but in pursuance of an appropriation made by law, and on a warrant issued thereon by the
Auditor." ' 2 1 This specific injunction has been followed by the
legislature in the statute dealing with the manner of paying public moneys out of the treasury.22 By a further statutory restriction every appropriation expires at the end of the fiscal year for
which made, with an additional sixty days' grace.2 3 It follows
not only that tax moneys paid into the state treasury cannot be
reached by court process, but also that such funds may not be
disbursed except pursuant to a valid legislative appropriation.
The non-existence of such an appropriation, or its expiration
when made, constitutes a barrier to recovery of tax money second
only to the constitutional immunity of the state. Tax claims are
thus so hedged about that they stand on very narrow ground in
West Virginia. The taxpayer's concern is to have his claim determined somehow before the money reaches the treasury.
Tax claims are roughly divisible into two classes: (1) excessive payments where the right to a refund is reasonably clear,
arising through mistake, clerical error, oversight, erroneous estimate in making an advance payment of taxes, or a palpably erroneous application of the tax laws; and (2) excessive payments
where the right to recover is a matter of substantial controversy,
arising through mistake, illegality, or unconstitutionality. In respect to claims of the first class, if an administrative officer or body
has been clothed with statutory authority to make refunds, and
if there is an unexpired appropriation covering the matter, there
is little or no difficulty. A judicial determination is unnecessary,
:9 Smith v. Reeves, supra n.18; Pennoyer v. McConnaughy, 140 U. S. 1, 10,
11 S. Ct. 699 (1890); Ea" parte State of New York, 256 U. S. 490, 500, 41 S.
Ct. 588 (1921); McClellan v. State, 35 Cal. App. 605, 170 Pac. 662 (1917);
Bow v. Plummer, 79 N. H. 23, 104 AtI. 35 (1918) ; Lord & Polk Chemical Co.
v. Board of Agriculture, 111 N. C. 135, 15 S. E. 1032 (1892); Fidelity Co. v,
Shaid, supra n. 16.
20 Davis v. W. Va. Bridge Commission, 113 W. Va. 110, 112, 166 S. E. 819
(1933).
21 W.

VA. CoxsT., art. X,

§

3.

22 W. VA. CODE ANN. (Michie,
23 W. VA. CODE ANN. (Michie,

1932) c. 12, art. 3, § 1.
1932) c. 12, art. 3, § 12.
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and there is no constitutional barrier against the payment of the
claim from funds in the treasury. If, despite the administrative
sanction of the refund, some other official along the line proves
obstinate, mandamus can be invoked to force the issuance of the
necessary requisition on the auditor and warrant on the
treasurer.24 As to the second class of claims where the right to
recover is a matter of substantial controversy, the mere existence
of some statutory procedure for an administrative determination
may avail the taxpayer nothing, particularly if the determination
lies with the collecting officer who may be disinclined subconsciously to favor the taxpayer, legal presumptions to the contrary
notwithstanding. The only truly adequate remedy open to the
taxpayer in West Virginia may be (1) a common law action
against the collector in his personal capacity, or (2) injunctive
relief restraining the collection of the tax, or enjoining its payment over into the treasury and compelling a return of the identical funds to the taxpayer. Whether these avenues are foreclosed
to the taxpayer in either the state or federal courts, or both, by
reason of existing statutory procedure purporting to set up adequate machinery for handling tax claims is a serious, involved inquiry. In some of our taxing statutes the legislature has devoted
considerable attention to provisions for refunds and for the recovery of excessive tax payments; in others the treatment is cursory, ambiguous and inadequate. In many instances, the construction, scope and constitutionality of such provisions have not been
passed upon judicially. It would seem that all types of taxes are
susceptible to common treatment so far as the mechanics of presenting and determining tax claims is concerned. At the least,
no question ought ever to arise as to what remedy the legislature
intended the taxpayer to pursue.25 A modern, uniform procedure
should aim to facilitate the presentation of claims and to assure
to the taxpayer a ready means of satisfying any determination
in his favor. A consideration of this suggestion requires an examination of the deficiencies of existing procedure, and a de24 Eureka Pipe Line Co. v. Riggs, 75 W. Va. 353, 83 S. E.1020 (1914); Hall
v. County Court, 82 W. Va. 564, 568, 96 S. E. 966 (1918); and see Draper v.
Anderson, 102 W. Va. 633, 135 S. E. 837 (1926).
2r The provision in the chain store tax statute was held to be of such doubtful and uncertain meaning as to warrant the granting of injunctive relief by
the federal courts. Standard Oil Co. v. Fox, supra n. 8. It reads in part:
91.... the party claiming that any license is not due, for any reason, shall pay
the same under protest with the right to collect the same from the state tax
commissioner by an appropriate remedy as provided by law." W. VA. CODE
ANN. (Meichie, Supp. 1933) c. 11, art. 13A, § 11.
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termination as to what uniform procedure could be adopted that
would interfere as little as possible with the fiscal requirements
of the government, adequately protect the taxpayer's interest,
and satisfy constitutional requirements.
I
R~efunds of Excessive Tax Payments Where the Right is
Reasonably Clear
Even in the matter of refunding tax moneys20 where the
right of the taxpayer is fairly beyond controversy, the question
of legislative authorization is foremost. The power to refund
seems so essential to an orderly and satisfactory administration of
tax laws that it would be considered impliedly conferred upon
officials charged with the collection of taxes. But the general
rule is otherwise. The authority must be expressly conferred.27
Many taxpayers, aware of the general aggrandizement of the
office of tax commissioner in recent years, might reasonably suppose the power to order refunds of all state taxes to have been
lodged there. Beginning as a subordinate executive position in
1904 with certain supervisory powers over the assessment and
collection of taxes and levies previously vested in the auditor, 8
the office of tax commissioner has been given additional powers
and duties from time to time until today, under the state's new
system of taxation, it has taken on tremendous new importance
with respect to the administration and enforcement of tax laws
and the control of governmental indebtedness. Although an appointive office, created by the legislature, it is now of equal importance with many of those ranked as "high constitutional offices". Still, until the last session of the legislature the tax commissioner had no general power to order tax refunds.
Almost one year ago, the present incumbent of the office,
apparently faced with numerous requests for refunds of excessive tax payments, and doubtful of his authority to order refunds
of some taxes, requested an opinion on the subject from the at§ 1259.
CooL-, supra n. 26, p. 2506, citing Howell v. Bd. of Com'rs Ada Co., 6
Idaho 154, 53 Pac. 542 (1898).
28W. Va. Acts 1904, c. 4, § 1; W. VA. CODE AxN.
(Michie, 1932) c. 11, art.
1, § 2; State v. Graybeal, 60 W. Va. 357, 359, 55 S. E. 398 (1907); Blue v.
Tetrick, 69 W. Va. 742, 72 S. E. 1033 (1911); Ohio Fuel Oil Co. v. Price,
77 W. Va. 207, 87 S. E. 202 (1915).
26 See, generally, 3 CooLEY, TAXATIOx (4th ed. 1924)
27
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torney-general. 9 At that time, there was no statute purporting
to set up a uniform procedure for refunding all state taxes and
granting to the tax commissioner the authority to receive and determine claims for refunds. Some of the various statutes imposing taxes were not clear, either as to the power of the tax commissioner to pass on such claims 0 or as to the procedure to be
followed by him to cause refunds from the treasury to be made.3 1
In at least one instance, the privilege tax on carrier corporations,
the statute made no provision whatsoever for refunds.32 The attorney-general, basing his opinion on an examination of the various taxing laws, stated the rule requiring an express authorization for refunding taxes, and concluded that the tax commissioner
33
had the clear authority to order refunds in only three instances,
34
namely, gasoline taxes, business and occupation taxes (gross
sales or income) 33 and the non-intoxicating beer tax.
Since then
29 REP. AT'rY GEN OF W. VA. 1933-34, 620. The tax commissioner wrote in
part: "The question of the legal right of this department to make refunds in
a case where taxes have been erroneously collected is frequently presenting
itself. From such examination of the law as I have been able to make, I am
very much in doubt as to the power of the department to make these refunds.
I would, therefore, be glad if you would give me an opinion covering the entire
ground, and, in particular, the following points: (1) The extent and basis of
any right of a taxpayer to have a refund on taxes paid through mistake, either
as to the amount of the tax or as to the payment of any tax; and (2) the
limitation upon the right of this department to make such refunds in proper
cases. Your attention is called to the provision in each budget bill appropriating money for the purpose of making refunds, and your attention is further
called to the statute which seems to limit the right to file a claim against the

state to five years."
so W. VA. CODE ANm.

(Michie, Supp. 1933) c. 11, art. 13A, § 11 (chain store
tax, no provision as to simple refunds); ibid, c. 11, art. 3, §§ 25, 27 (property
taxes, silent as to power of tax commissioner to order refund of taxes for state
purposes); ibid., c. 11, art. 6, §§ 17, 18 (property taxes on public service corporations, silent as to power of tax commissioner to make refunds of taxes
paid by mistake); ibid., c. 11, art. 11, §§ 20, 24 (inheritance and transfer
taxes, provides for compromise and settlement by tax commissioner, not clear
as to power to order refunds of overpayments made under protest prior to
compromise in excess of amount later agreed upon as compromise settlement,
or refunds of excess payments made by mistake).
31 E. g., the gasoline tax statute merely provides that the tax commissioner
shall cause' the refund to be made. W. VA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1932) e. 11,
art. 14, §§' 19, 20. As to property taxes collected for state purposes, it is provided that the order of a circuit court on appeal finding that the taxpayer had
been taxed erroneously, should entitle the claimant to a warrant on the state
treasury for the amount thereof, if application for the same be made to the
auditor within one year after date of such order. W. VA. CODEA N. (Michie,
1932) c. 11, art. 3, § 26.
32 W. VA. CODE AN-.
(Michie,
33 REP. A2''Y GEN. Or W. VA.

Supp. 1933) c. 11, art. 12A.
1933-34, 620.
34W. VA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1932) c. 11, art. 14, §§ 19, 20.
35 W. VA. CODE ANi. (Michie, Supp. 1933) c. 11, art. 13, § 6.

36 W. VA. CODE ANN. (Michie, Supp. 1933) c. "11, art. 12, § 95, required the
payment of the tax by estimate for the year and provided for refunds from
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additional authority has been conferred expressly on the commissioner to refund "excessive or incorrect" payments under the
personal net income tax law,3 7 and to refund the purchase price
of certain spirituous liquor stamps required to be affixed by a
8
prior law2
The personal net income tax law uniquely provides for some
refunds which are not intended to come out of the state treasury.
It requires the tax commissioner to examine every return filed by
a taxpayer as soon as practicable. If the amount of the tax has
not been computed correctly, the commissioner is directed to refund the excess "out of the proceeds of the tax retained by him." 3"
Another section requires him to pay all collections into the state
treasury," so that it is not clear what proceeds he is to retain,
unless it be intended that he retain for such purpose all tax payments until the accompanying returns have been examined. But
the statute further provides for application to the tax commissioner for revision of an assessment within one year from the time
of filing a return or from the date of the notice of an additional
assessment, and appeal to the circuit court within thirty days
from the determination by the commissioner.41 The circuit court
is directed to order refunds of taxes paid "in excess of those
legally assessed" by the commissioner.42 Here the statute does
not specify how such refunds shall be made, although at the time
the court orders the refund all the proceeds of tax collections presumably will have been paid into the treasury. The same situation obtains as to several other tax laws. 43 It may be unimportant.
Perhaps there should be read into every statute authorizing a refund the constitutional requirement that money payments from
the treasury shall be made pursuant to a warrant issued by the
auditor and directed to the treasurer. 44 Some recent statutes,
the state treasury, presumably by the tax commissioner. This is now amended
to require monthly payment of the tax upon actual figures rather than estimates, and there is no express provision in the non-intoxicating beer statute
authorizing refunds for mistake. W. VA. CODE AxN. (Michie, Supp. 1934) c.
11, art. 12, § 95.
37 W. Va. Acts 1935, H. B. No. 441 §§ 45, 54.
38 W. Va. Acts 1935, H. B. 524, § 1, authorizes refunds as to the stamps
required to be affixed to spirituous liquors by W. Va. Acts, 1st Extra. Sess.
1933, c.21, § 5 (e).
39 W. Va. Acts 1935, H. B. No. 441, § 45.
4o Supra n. 39, § 59.
41 Supra n. 39, §§ 53, 54.
42 Supra n. 39, § 54.
43 Supra n. 31; likewise as to the non-intoxicating beer tax law, W. VA. CODE
AxN. (MIichie, Supp. 1933) c. 11, art. 12, § 95.
44 Snpra n. 21.
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such as the amended gross sales tax statute, 45 explicitly provide
that erroneous payments be refunded to the taxpayer upon the
requisition of the tax commissioner to the auditor, who shall draw
his warrant on the treasurer, payable out of any funds available
for the purpose. Sometimes it is provided that the order finding
that there was an overpayment may, or shall, be credited against
4
taxes subsequently accruing. 1
In West Virginia a matter of equal importance with the existence of an express authorization to order refunds is the constitutional requirement of an appropriation as the basis for paying moneys out of the treasury. 7 Apparently to satisfy this requirement, the legislature for many years has customarily made
a blanket appropriation at every biennial session4" for the two
succeeding fiscal years in connection with other appropriations
for the treasurer's office "for refunding overpayments made into
the Treasury on account of taxes, licenses, fines and commissions,
as may be necessary for the purpose, paysuch an amount ....
able out of the same fund into which paid," 9 and similarly in
connection with the auditor's office a blanket appropriation "for
refunding moneys erroneously paid into the Treasury such sums
.... as may have been erroneously paid, payable out of the same
fund into which paid." 50 Such appropriations are sufficiently
specific, being limited by the amounts that may be erroneously
paid or overpaid during a given fiscal year. The origin, history
and intended scope of these blanket provisions are not definitely
known to the writer. It is reasonably clear that the purpose is
to provide an essential step in the procedure of refunding moneys
from the treasury. Claims for refunds falling within the scope of
45

Supra n. 35.

c. 11, art. 6, § 18 (assessment of
public service corporations, provides that the auditor shall issue to the owner
or operator a certificate showing the amount of taxes and levies which were
overpaid, and that such certificate shall be receivable thereafter for the amount
of such overpayment in payment of any taxes and levies assessed against the
property of such owner or operator, etc.); ibid., c. 11, art. 13, § 6 (business
and occupation taxes, the taxpayer may, at his election, apply an overpayment
credit to taxes subsequently accruing hereunder).
46 W. VA. CODE ANx. (Michie, Supp..1933)

47S upra n. 21.

48 An examination of the appropriation bills passed at every session of the
legislature for a number of years shows this to be the fact.
49 W. Va. Acts 1st Extra. Sess. 1933, c. 1, Treasurer's Office Appropriations,

§ 111-(L).

no W. Va. Acts 1st Extra. Sess. 1933, c. 1, Auditor's Office Appropriations,

§ 7 (A).
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these provisions need not be presented directly to the legislature. 1
Any duly authorized official or body thus has the necessary appropriation as the basis for issuing a requisition on the auditor
for a warrant requiring the treasurgr to pay the amount of the
tax refund. It has been suggested that these blanket provisions
were intended to impart a limited elasticity to the administration
of tax laws, and that they have been used in refunding taxes
where it was apparent that more was paid than was rightly due
to the state.2 The appropriation for the auditor's office refers
to erroneous payments generally, not merely to tax payments. It
doubtless covers erroneous payments of all taxes collected by the
auditor. 53 It is not clear to the writer what other erroneous payments than those on account of taxes may be comprehended by the
wording of the provision. The appropriation for the treasurer's
office enumerates overpayments on account of taxes, licenses, fines
and commissions, and presumably covers the refunding of such
moneys on the requisition of any state official authorized to so
order. Both appropriation provisions may have been intended to
apply simply to tax payments, and perhaps an appropriation was
made for each of the two officers immediately concerned in the
payment of any moneys from the treasury in order to avoid any
possible question as to the existence of a properly applicable appropriation. It has been accurately observed that these appropriation provisions merely supply the funds from which to make
tax refunds, and do not furnish, in themselves, a blanket authority
to any official or body to order refunds of state taxes. 4 It has
been further stated that such refunds should be made out of the
funds of t7he fiscal year into which the "overpayments" and "erroneous payments" were made." This accords with the general
provision as to appropriations, and limits the authority of the
auditor in issuing warrants to a period of not more than sixty
dAys after the end of the fiscal year in which the "overpayments"
or "erroneous payments" were made."
51 Petitions to the legislature for the payment of money are provided for
in W. VA. Com ANN. (Michie, 1932) c. 12, art. 3, § 3.
52 This information was received from a former official with many years of
experience in the tax commissioner's office.
53 The auditor is charged with the collection of certain taxes. W. VA. CODE
ANN. (Michie, 1932) c. 11, art. 12, §§ 70, 71 (charter tax on domestic corporations); W. VA. CODE ANN. (Michie, Supp. 1933) c. 11, art. 6 (property tax
on public service corporations).
5' REP. Arr'y GFN. op W. VA. 1933-34, 620.

5 Supra n. 54.

5 eSupra n.

23.
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The inquiry of the tax commissioner to the attorney-general
served the purpose of bringing the subject of tax refunds to the
attention of the legislature. At its recently concluded session, an
act57 was passed adding section 2-a to the article of the code dealing with the general powers and duties of the tax commissioner
and providing thlat:
"Within one year after an excess payment of a state tax,
the taxpayer may submit to the tax commissioner a certified
claim for a refund. If the tax commissioner determines that
there has been an excess payment and that the claim for a
refund is legitimate, he shall issue his requisition upon the
treasurer for the refunding of the proper amount.
The
auditor shall issue his warrant to the treasurer, and the
treasurer shall pay the warrant out of the fund into which
the amount was originally paid."
The statute is commendable for attempting to clear up a
matter which should never be left in doubt. The taxpayer is entitled to some simple method of presenting such claims.
The
statute confers upon the tax commissioner the power to order refunds as to all state taxes. To the extent that the commissioner
already has such power in specific instances, there is some overlapping. The new law, will cover those situations where it was
not clear in the past that any particular official was designated to
act."
It provides an informal, uniform procedure, conforming
to constitutional requirements," for causing refunds to be made
from the treasury. Criticism may be levelled at the act because
it confers a blanket authority on the commissioner as to all state
taxes, including some taxes collected by other state officers. 0
Thus, the commissioner may be requested to pass upon claims as
to which his department has no previous knowledge or information. The same uniform procedure might have been outlined, and
the authority to resort to the procedure conferred, not on a single official, but on all state officers, charged with the collection of
any tax, as to excessive payments made to their respective departments.
The statute provides that the treasurer shall pay the warrant
out of the fund into which the amount was originally paid. Does
57 W. Va. Acts 1935, S. B. No. 291, adding section 2 (a) to W. VA. REV.
CoDE (1931) e. 11, art. 1.
-8 E. g., the tax on certain carrier corporations. W. VA. CoDE ANN. (Michie,
Supp. 1933) c. 11, art. 12A.

0 Supra n. 21.

0 Supra n. 53.
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this, in itself, constitute an appropriation of moneys from which
the refunds are to be paid? In State ex ret. Key v. Bond, Au1
ditor,e
the court considered a general statute specifying the sums
to be expended annually for necessary clerk hire by certain named
officials, in their discretion. The statute placed the amount of
$1100.00 at the disposal of the secretary of state. Later in the
same session, the legislature passed a general appropriation bill
fixing an amount of $1200.00 for clerk hire in the office of the
secretary of state. The court held that the general law was superseded by the subsequent provision in the general appropriation
bill. As to the constitutionality of the earlier provision, it said:
"As suggested in argument, there is strong ground for
holding section 3 void as being contrary to section 3, article
X, of the Constitution, which provides that 'No money shall
be drawn from the treasury but in pursuance of an appropriation made by law;' but we find it unnecessary to pass
upon that proposition."
It follows from this decision that the validity of the direction in
the new refunding statute, as an appropriation, is doubtful. Consequently, reliance must be had, as in the past, on the blanket
appropriation provisions62 passed at every session of the legislature. The application of the refunding statute is limited, therefore, by whatever administrative or judicial construction may be
placed on these blanket appropriations. If this view is correct, a
material difficulty is presented since the refunding statute authorizes the presentation of a claim within one year after the excess
payment of any state tax. Unless this could possibly be construed as intended to keep alive the appropriations for the ins1 94 W. Va. 255, 263, 265, 118 S. E. 276 (1923). The statute involved in
the Key case was W. Va. Acts 1882, c. 87, W. VA. CODE (Barnes, 1923) c.
11, § 3. The question seems to be whether a provision for a certain class of
expenditures, e. g., refunds, by a general law purporting to direct the payment
out of the fund into which paid is a sufficient compliance with the constitutional
requirement of an appropriation for the payment of any money from the treasury. Another illustration is afforded by the provision for refunds under the
gasoline tax statute that "any moneys received by the State and required to
be repaid shall be treated as moneys erroneously paid into the treasury and
refunds shall be made and be payable out of the same fund into which paid."
W. VA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1932) c. 11, art. 14, § 22. Again, it is provided
under the business and occupation tax statute that refunds shall be made, payable out of any funds available for the purpose. This rather clearly requires
as the basis for the payment an appropriation by the legislature, and of coqrse,
and "erroneous payments"
the blanket appropriations for "overpayments'
into the state treasury serve that purpose. W. VA. CODu ANN. (Miebio, Supp.

1933)
c. 11, art. 13, §§ 6, 8.
2
6 SUpra n. 49 and 50.
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definite period of one year from the time of any excess payment,
conceivably a claim for refund might be presented to the tax commissioner after the expiration of the fiscal year in which the excess payment was made and after the allowed period of grace,
at a time when the auditor arguably no longer had the authority
to issue a warrant for the refund.
The new refunding statute is loosely drawn in some respects.
The "certified" claim to be presented by the taxpayer to the commissioner probably refers to a "verified" application for refund.
More serious is the fact that the extent of the authority of the
commissioner is not plainly indicated. In the opinion of the attorney-general, 63 transmitted prior to the enactment of this statute, the tax commissioner was advised that
"where there can be no controversy as to the fact that
payments are overpayments or erroneous payments, we believe the tax commissioner would have authority to make refunds of such overpayments or erroneous payments out of
the funds into which paid. If there can be no difference of
opinion as to the nature of such payments, we do not believe
it is contemplated that a formal proceeding of any kind is
required."
It would seem that the authority of the tax commissioner under
the new refunding statute extends no further; that the act simply
makes plain his authority to act with reference to an excess payment of any state tax and details the procedure to be followed.
The typical case of an excess payment of a tax is found in the
situation where some tax was due but more was paid than was
legally assessable and collectible. This may arise from either a
mistake of fact by the taxpayer, or a clerical error of some official
in computing the amount of the tax. Wherever this clearly appears the tax commissioner has the power to receive claims for
refunds informally within one year after the excess payment and
order the same paid, subject to possible qualifications arising out
of conflict with other existing statutory procedure. Thus, under
the gasoline tax statute, the commissioner is authorized to cause
refunds to be made for the tax paid on gasoline exported or lost,
provided the application is filed within thirty days after the close
of the month during which the gasoline was exported or lost;6
he may cause refunds to be made for the tax paid on gasoline used
63 Supra n. 54.
64 W. VA. CoDE ANN. (MAichie, 1932) c. 11, art. 14, § 19.
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for certain enumerated, non-taxable purposes, provided the application is filed within sixty days from the date of purchase or
delivery of such gasoline.8 5 May the commissioner now entertain
claims for refunds on such grounds within one year from the time
the excess payment was made? Again, under the law dealing with
the assessment of real property, it is provided that any taxpayer
claiming to be aggrieved by any entry in the property books of
the county, resulting from a mistake or clerical error, may, within
one year from the time the property books are delivered to the
sheriff, apply for relief to the county court.1 May the commissioner now entertain claims for refunds of that character on account of taxes paid for state purposes? Perhaps the new refunding statute provides a cumulative remedy in such instances, pursuant to which the tax commissioner may act in cases where the
right to the refund is clear. A prior resort to other procedure,
of course, should preclude application by a taxpayer to the commissioner under the new statute, and claims involving a controversy on the ground of illegality or unconstitutionality probably
must be presented in a formal proceeding, either as outlined in
the various taxing statutes, or according to the common law.
II
Recovery of Disputed Tax Payments
A. The Common Law Action against the Collector in the Courts
of West Virginia and in the Federal Courts
At common law assumpsit for money had and received was
the usual remedy 7 for the recovery of taxes paid under duress,
or its legal equivalent. A legislature can refund taxes voluntarily paid,68 but in the courts the generally stated rule, in the absence of a statute providing for repayment, is that illegally or
unconstitutionally collected taxes must have been paid under comVA. CoDE ANx. (Michie, 1932) c. 11, art. 14, § 20.
66 W. VA. CoDE ANN. (Michie, Supp. 1933) e. 11, art. 3,
65 W.

§ 27.
Coo=, TAxATio (4th ed. 1924) §§ 1276, 1277, 1300.
68 Supra n. 67, § 1282; People ez rel. Eckerson v. Bd. of Education, 126 App.
Div. 414, 110 N. Y. Supp. 769 (1908); Commonwealth v. Ferries Co., 120 Va.
h 'Wisconsin, after an inheritance tax statute had
827, 92 S. E. 804 (1917).
been held unconstitutional, Schlesinger v. Wisconsin, 270 U. S. 230, 46 S. Ct.
260 (1926), the legislature recognized its moral obligation to repay the taxes
previously collected and provided for refunds of collections back to a specifi e
date. This act was upheld in Be Heinemann's Will, 201 Wis. 484, 230 N. W.
698 (1930).
67 3
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pulsion and under protest to be recoverable6 9 So stated, the law
would seem to require a formal written protest by the taxpayer
as a prerequisite to recovery. In most cases in the books the existence of duress or compulsion as the motivating factor in making the payment usually has been brought home to the tax collector
through the medium of such a protest. But it has been recognized,
as &a abstract principle at least, that duress or compulsion alone
may suffice, and that formal written protest is unnecessary.0
In a doubtful case, the fact that, protest actually had been made
would be considered in determining the question of duress or
compulsion. 71
These common law prerequisites in many instances have
undergone statutory revision. For example, it is provided in the
chain store tax statute that "the party claiming that any license
is not due, for any reason, shall pay the same under protest with
the right to collect the same from the state tax commissioner by
an appropriate remedy as provided by law. "I2 The statute, itself, thus makes protest the sole condition precedent to bringing
an appropriate action for recovery. The legal effect is to make
the payment of a tax under protest involuntary, irrespective of
any question of technical duress of person or property or of compulsion within the rules of the common law.7 3 In such cases of
statutory revision the taxpayer must bring himself within, and
substantially comply with, the terms prescribed.74
The provision in the chain store tax statute does not prescribe
any particular formalities for making the payment under protest. It has been held elsewhere that the protest need not be in
writing unless the statute requires it ;75 nor need the grounds of
protest be stated in the notice of protest in the absence of statutory direction." Nevertheless, in recent litigation involving the
6DCommonwealth v. Ferries, supra n. 68; Field, op. oit. supra n. 9, at 45
Haav. L. REv. 511, Notes (1927) 48 A. L. R. 1381, 1385; (1931) 74 A. L. R.
1301, 1302.
70 3 Coo=, TAxATioN, § 1297; Newberry v. City of Detroit, 184 Mich. 188,
150 N. W. J38 (1915); Koewing v. West Orange, 891N. J. L. 539, 99 Atl. 203
(1916) ; International Paper Co. v. Tirrill. 960 Fed. 664, 665-6 (D. C. Mass.
1919).
713 CoomL,
TAxAmo § 1297; Union Pac. R.Co. v. Dodge County, 98 U. S.
541, 25 L. ed. 196 (1878); Koewing v. West Orange, supra n. 70.
72 . VA.CODE AxN. (Michie, Supp. 1933) c. 11, art. 13A, § 11.
733 Coo=zy, TA XTioN, §§ 1296, 1298; 61 C. T. "Taxation?', p. 994; Note
(1929) 11 V'A. L. RBv. 134, 136.

§ 1298.
75 Murdock v. Murdock, 38 Utah 373, 113 Pae. 330 (1911).

74 3 Coo=,Y, TAXAT oN,
76

3 Coo=,r, TAXA..ON, § 1298.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol41/iss4/4

16

Sclove: Refunds and Recovery of State Taxes Erroneously, Illegally, or Un
364

REFUNDS AND RECOVERY OF STATE TAXES

validity and constitutionality of the application of the chain store
tax to gasoline filling stations several oil companies, required to
pay taxes aggregating nearly a half million dollars, cautiously
directed a formal letter of protest to the tax commissioner setting
forth the precise grounds of complaint. 77 In at least one of the
78
letters the payment was expressly stated to be under duress.
To the extent that the statute prescribed the procedure, and even
beyond the express requirements, these taxpayers had complied
and were privileged to rely upon mere payment under protest as
the basis of recovery, if the Supreme Court of the United States
had held ultimately that the application of the tax to such stations
was unintended by the legislature or unconstitutional.
The gross sales tax statute goes even further, and by express
provision dispenses with protest against the payment and demand
upon the tax commissioner prior to institution of an action. 0
Other statutes, while not so explicit, seem also to contemplate a
In connection with state
recovery of taxes voluntarily paid.
license taxes generally, the only requirement is an application to
the tax commissioner for review by any person dissatisfied with
the amount assessed, or with any decision respecting the license,
and appeal to the circuit court and supreme court of appeals. 0
Similarly, the personal net income tax law 1 merely provides for
an application to the tax commissioner within one year, and appeal to the circuit court. The tenor of the statute is such that the
usual common law prerequisites for recovery do not seem to
82

govern.

As previously noted, 3 in West Virginia the common law
remedy is controlled by the constitution to the extent that no
judicial proceeding to recover moneys paid into the treasury will
lie against the state or its representative. Any action against the
tax collector, in his official capacity, to be satisfied out of public
funds, is barred. A leading ease on the subject, arising in the
federal courts, is Smitk v. Reeves. 4 Smith brought an action at
law against McDonald, as Treasurer of the State of California.
77 Standard Oil Co. v. Fox, spra n. 8, and companion cases brought by other
oil companies.
78 This was the letter of the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey.
79 W. VA. CODE ANN. (Michie, Supp. 1933) c. 11, art. 13, § 8.
so W. VA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1932) c. 11, art. 12, §§ 19, 20.

81 W. Va. Acts 1935, H. B. No. 441, §§ 53, 54.
82 3 COOLEY, TAxATION, §§ 1277, 1282.
83 upra n. 19 and n. 20.
84 Supra n. 18.
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Reeves, his successor in office, was later substituted as the party
defendant. The relief sought was a judgment against the defendant "as Treasurer of the State of California" for the amount
of taxes paid to the comptroller of the state with written notice
of intention to bring the action against the state treasurer pursuant to the state statute providing that, if final judgment should
be obtained against the treasurer, the comptroller, upon presentation to him of a certified copy of the same, should draw a warrant
upon the treasurer, who must pay the amount of taxes thus
judicially declared to have been illegally collected. In approving
the lower court's dismissal of the action, the Supreme Court of the
United States held that the state had only consented to be sued in
its own courts in the statute relied upon by the plaintiff, and
said :s"
"Although the State, as such, is not made a party defendant, the suit is against one of its officers as Treasurer;
the relief sought is a judgment against that officer in his
official capacity; and that judgment would compel him to
pay out of the public funds in the treasury of the State a
certain sum of money. Such a judgment would have the
same effect as if it were rendered directly against the State
for the amount specified in.the complaint ..... In the present
case the action is not to recover specific moneys in the hands
of the State Treasurer nor to compel him to perform a plain
ministerial duty. It is to enforce the liability of the State to
pay a certain amount of money on account of the payment of
taxes alleged to have been wrongfully exacted by the State
from the plaintiffs."
The view expressed is unquestionably logical and correct, and
it should control the decision of the West Virginia courts whenever confronted with the identical question. Yet certain of our
taxing statutes purport to authorize actions of this character.
The law imposing business and occupation taxes (gross sales or
income) provides"0 that any person improperly charged with any
tax and required to pay the same may recover the amount paid,
together with interest, in any proper action or suit against the
tax commissioner. Original jurisdiction is conferred, without
any preliminary requirements as to protest or demand, on the
circuit court of the county in which the taxpayer resides, or is
located. The court is authorized to adjudge the costs in any man-, Supra n. 18, at 178 U. S. 438-9.
se8W. VA. CODE ANN. (Mieie, Supp. 1933) c. 11, art. 13, § 8.
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ner deemed equitable. The action in the circuit court leads directly to the state treasury. Upon the presentation of a certified copy
of the judgment so obtained, the state auditor is directed to issue
his warrant on any available funds. Assuming that the previously
discussed blanket appropriation provisions supply the necessary
funds for payment, the question of the constitutionality of the
procedure remains. In contrast, the very same section provides
a valid alternative, an administrative proceeding by way of appeal to the board of public works from an assessment by the tax
commissioner within thirty days after the notice thereof is mailed
to the taxpayer. The board is directed to make such order in the
premises as may appear to it just and lawful, after a hearing, and
to furnish a copy of the order to the taxpayer. As to this administrative proceeding the attorney-general has suggested8 7 that the
board of public works can enter an order in such proceeding directing a refund of taxes erroneously paid, upon the basis of
which the tax commissioner could be required to issue his requisition on the auditor. 8 In turn, it would be the auditor's duty to
issue a warrant on the treasurer. This suggestion, again, rests
on the existence of the blanket appropriations for repaying "overpayments" and "erroneous payments" from the state treasury.8"
Recalling that the state's immunity is limited strictly to any
"court of law or equity""9 it seems entirely lawful for the legislature to provide an administrative proceeding for the refunding
and recovery of tax moneys. So long as there is an applicable
appropriation, no possible objection can be raised. It is one thing
to empower an administrative officer or body to make a refund.
It is a vastly different matter, under the existing constitutional
provision, to hail an official into court, representing the state's
liability, for a judgment or decree to be satisfied from the public
funds.
The fact that a statute purports to authorize the procedure of subjecting a collecting officer to such judicial action can
add nothing to its validity. In other states where the constitution
states that the legislature may provide for suits against the state,
provision for such statutory actions against the collecting officer
is valid. Almost certainly, in West Virginia such a judicial controversy must be considered unconstitutional.
Much the same question is raised by the personal net income
87 See n. 54, sutpra.

88 Supra n. 86, § 6.
89 Supra n. 49 and n. 50.
9DSupra n. 13.
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tax law which provides for an application to the tax commissioner
to find that the tax assessed was "excessive or incorrect",' 1 and

further provides :52
"A taxpayer may appeal from the determination of the
commissioner any time within thirty days after the deterruination. He shall file a complaint in the circuit court of
the county in which he resides, or if not a resident, in which
he conducts his businesM, trade or occupation, or has taxable
income. Thereupon, appropriate proceedings shall be had
and the relief, if any, to which the taxpayer may be entitled
may be granted and any taxes, interest or penalties found by
the court to be in excess of those legally assessed shall be
ordered refunded to the taxpayer, with interest from time of
payment."
The proceeding in the circuit court is denominated an "appeal",
but the approach, which suggests itself as controlling, involves an
ascertainment of whether or not the proceeding constitutes mere
supervision and review by the court, or a judicial controversy.
If a claim of unconstitutionality was contemplated to be raised in
this manner, the proceeding then would clearly involve a' judicial
controversy. Being commenced by complaint, presumably against
the tax commissioner, filed in a "court of law," the statute runs
counter to the provision for tile state's immunity. Of course, not
every proceeding before the circuit court constitutes judicial action. In one instance93 the Circuit Court of Kanawha County is
utilized to audit pecuniary claims against the state to be reported
by the auditor to the legislature for its consideration at the next
following session. Circuit courts are also used in the assessment
of real property for taxation.9 It has been held there that judicial action is involved if the controversy is concerning the right
1) W. Va. Acts 1935, H. B. No. 441, § 53.
O2 Supra n. 91, § 54.
03 W. VA. CODE AIM. (Michie, 1932) c. 14, art. 2, § 1. This statute is discussed in Robinson v. LaFollette, supra n. 14, and in Standard Oil Co. v. Fox,
supra n. 8.

94 W. VA. CoDE AxN. (Michie, Supp. 1933) c. 11, art. 3, § 25. The circuit
court is also used to supervise the decision of the board of public works as to
the assessment and valuation of the property of public service corporations. It
has been held that this action is administrative, not judicial, the court acting
in such case as an appellate assessment or tax tribunal and exercising powers
distinct from those belonging to it as a court or judicial tribunal in the legal
sense of that term. W. VA. CODE ANw. (Michie, 1932) c. 11, art. 6, §§ 11, 12;
P. C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 28 W. Va. 264, 267 (1886) ; State
v. South Penn Oil Co., 42 W. Va. 80, 94, 24 S. E. 688 (1896). But the decision
of the circuit court under this statute on a question of discrimination constitutes judicial action, not administrative. N. & W. By. Co. v. Bd. of Pub.
Works, 3 F. Supp. 791, 796 (S. D. W. Va. 1933).
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of the state to tax the property, or the constitutionality of the
statute providing the method of valuing the property," but that
there can be no appeal or writ of error to a judgment or order
of a circuit court, on an appeal from the order of the county
court, in respect to an erroneous assessment of property, involving
only a question of valuation." If the same viewpoint obtains generally, the constitutionality of a statutory action against a state
officer looking to the recovery of money from the treasury depends
on the nature of the controversy. From that viewpoint, since the
aforementioned provisions in the statutes, relating to business
and occupation taxes and to the net income tax, apparently contemplate the presentation of some matters to the circuit court
calling for judicial action, to that extent at least they appear to
be violative of the constitutional provision giving to the state immunity against such action. The doctrine of Smith v. Reeves,"1
would require such a decision by the federal courts sitting in
West Virginia. Statutes conferring jurisdiction upon the circuit
courts of the state cannot be deemed to grant consent to sue in the
courts of the nation, aside from the ultimate question as to the
power of the legislature of West Virginia to waive the immunity
in any event.9 8
The propriety of the common law remedy against the collecting officer for satisfaction from his personal assets, or on his
bond, is especially plain in a jurisdiction, such as West Virginia,
where the organic law forbids an action against the state of any
representative for a judgment to recover money from the treasury.
A search of the reported cases has failed to reveal an instance in
West Virginia where any state official, charged with the duty
of collecting taxes, has been sued at law personally to recover the
amount of tax payments alleged to have been illegally or unconstitutionally exacted, and turned over to the treasury. The right
to bring such an action may be inferred from an early expression
by the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals. In White Sulphur Springs Co. v. Holly,99 the court refused an injunction
against the tax collector of a township, and assigned as one rea95 Copp v. State, 69 W. Va. 439, 71 S. E. 580 (1911) ; Humphreys v. County
Court, 90 W. Va. 315, 110 S. E. 701 (1922).
96 Mackin v. County Court, 38 W. Va. 338, 18 S. E. 632 (1893); Ritchel
County Bank v. County Court, 65 W. Va. 208, 63 S. E. 1098 (1909); Copp v.
State, supra n. 95.

s7Supra n. 18 and n. 85.

8 Suapra m. 13.
4 W. Va. 597, 599 (1871).

89
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son for the refusal that no averment appeared in the bill of complaint that "the treasurer is insolvent, and that an action against
him at law would be unavailing." The court, thus, apparently
recognized the general availability of the common law action of
assumpsit to the wronged taxpayer.
At common law "there is great confusion in the cases as to
the effect of payment over to the government" by the defendant
collecting officer. 100 In some jurisdictions it is the settled rule
that the action will lie against the official even though he has paid
the money into the state treasury. This view has been strongly
stated by one federal court,' 01 applying it to the situation where
the collector knew the payment was under protest. Moneys paid
under protest should not be regarded by the collector as belonging
to the state. The right is plainly controverted, and, as between
the collector and the taxpayer, in such cases the state occupies an
impartial role. Therefore, an exception should be read by implication into the provisions of the various taxing statutes of West
Virginia, which usually require the prompt payment of all moneys
collected into the state treasury.0 2 This exception would allow
the tax commissioner or other collecting officer to retain in his
hands all moneys paid under compulsion and protest (or under
protest alone where that is made the sole requirement by statute)
pending the settlement of the dispute as to the right to possession
of the moneys. The protest made at the time of payment should
constitute notice to the officer that he should retain the money in
his hands, 1 3 especially so in West Virginia where the official presumably knows that payment over to the treasury immediately
raises serious obstacles to recovery in the path of the aggrieved
taxpayer.
The tax commissioner recently took a contrary position with
reference to section 11 of the chain store tax statute.10 The section forbids an injunction against the collection of taxes in the
state courts, requires payment under protest, and gives to the taxpayer the right "to collect the same from the state tax commissioner by an appropriate remedy as provided by law." The commissioner deemed the law to require payment of all funds accru100 Field, op. &it. supra n. 9, at 45 HAZv. L. Rzv. 517; 3 CooLEY, TAXATION,
§ 1299.
101 International Paper Co. v. Burrill, supra n. 70.
102 Supra n. 10.
103 Field, Zoo. cit. supra n. 100.

04w. VA. CODE ANN. (Michie, Supp. 1933) c. 11, art. 13, § 11; Standard
Oil Co. v. Fox, supra n. 8.
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ing in his hands monthly into the treasury, including tax moneys
paid under protest. Pursuant to that interpretation he ruled and
declared his intention of paying into the treasury certain large
sums of money paid by four protesting oil companies at the end
of the month in which the payments were made, thus forcing the
protestants to seek equitable relief against the threatened action.
In adopting this construction, the commissioner apparently took
the path involving the greatest hazard for himself, because the
payment over of moneys collected under compulsion and protest
may have subjected him to personal liability.
The most plausible construction of section 11, aforementioned, is that it impliedly authorizes the commissioner to retain
in his hands moneys paid under protest until the disposition of the
controversy. That the legislature intended that any controversy
should be settled between the taxpayer and the commissioner by
litigating the right to the very funds paid under protest is indicated by the language of the statute.' The taxpayer is told to
pay "the same" under protest, and he is given "the right to collect the same" from the commissioner. In giving this right, a
correlative duty was imposed on the commissioner to return the
same. 05 Clearly, an action against that officer after he has paid
over the funds into the state treasury would not enable the taxpayer to recover "the same"; he can then obtain only a general
judgment for a specified amount against the commissioner personally, not a claim against a specific, identified fund.
This view as to a proper construction of the chain store tax
statute, and indeed of all the taxing statutes on general considerations of reasonableness and fairness to the taxpayer, is fortified by
the argument that the legislature probably did not intend to impose on the tax commissioner or any other collecting officer a personal liability without providing him with some better assurance
of reimbursement than the somewhat doubtful prospect of a legislative appropriation to the amount of any judgment rendered in
the courts. 08 There should be some means of satisfying a claim
against the collecting officer besides levying upon his own property, which would be inadequate in the case of large taxpayers. 0 7
105 Union Pac. R. R. Co. v. Weld County, 247 U. S. 282, 284, 38 S. Ct. 510

(1918).

106 Field, op.

its s pra n. 9, at 77 U. or PA. L. REv. 166, and cases cited.
In the case of Standard Oil Co. v. Fox, mpra n. 8, it was stipulated that
the tax commissioner, while not personally insolvent, was not possessed of
money or property, personal or real, to the value of $240,000, the amount of
taxes required to be paid by the plaintiff oil company, and that so far as can
107
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The bonds required of state officials, who collect taxes, would,
moreover, be insufficient in some instances. 08 Of course, the matter should not be left to construction. The taxing statutes should
expressly authorize collecting officers to retain in their hands
moneys paid under protest, either for a specific period of time or
until a determination of any claim. The officers would then be
able to satisfy any demand against them. There would be no conflict with the constitution in such disputes over the possession of
the money between the taxpayer and the officer. The only possible difficulty might be a practical one in an increased tendency on
the part of taxpayers with no substantial claim to pay under protest and thus prevent the money from being turned over to the
treasury promptly.
The existence of an adequate remedy has been held sometimes
to preclude an action to recover the amotint of taxes paid. 0 9
Right to resort to the common law action against the collecting
officer, in the case of any particular type of tax, depends on the
legislative intent, namely, whether or not the statutory proceeding for contesting the payment of the tax and recovering the same
is exclusive. The intent is usually not apparent. If provision is
made for contesting the validity of an assessment or imposition
before payment, the taxpayer should resort ordinarily to the statutory procedure. But, if for some reason the time for making the
complaint passes before he knows about the matter, and he is
thereafter compelled to pay a void and illegal tax, the taxpayer
should be in a position to recover the amount of the payment
coerced from him.110 Since the common law action lies only under
extenuating circumstances in any event, it should be deemed
available unless the statutory remedy has been made plainly exclusive. The action is concerned entirely with illegal and void
exactions,"' not those merely irregular. 1 2 It involves judicial
action on a claim of illegality or unconstitutionality.
be reasonably anticipated, he would not be possessed in his personal capacity
of available money or property in an amount sufficient to enable him to respond
in damages to a money judgment in favor of the plaintiff. The 'payments of
the other protesting oil companies carried the total payments under protest to
nearly half a million dollars.
log The official bond of the tax commissioner is $5,000. W. VA. CODE ANxr.
(Michie, 1932) e. 11, art. 1, § 1. The bonds of the secretary of state and
auditor, both ofwhom collect taxes, are in the amount of $25,000 and $50,000,
respectively. Ibid., c. 6, art. 2, § 6.
109 3 COOLEY, TAXAT IoN

§

1278.

L10Powder River Cattle Co. v. Board of Com'rs, 45 Fed. 323 (C. C. Mont.

1891).

11M3

CooLEY,

TAxATioN

§ 1276.

112Ibid. §§ 1276, 1281.
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With one possible exception,"' none of the various taxing
statutes in West Virginia contain provisions expressly negativing
the right to resort to the common law remedy. The statutes are
usually couched in directory language, not in imperative form.
The net income tax law 1 4 provides that the taxpayer "may" seek
a revision of his tax by application to the tax commissioner and
appeal to the circuit court. If a taxpayer is coerced, actually or
impliedly, into making an unconstitutional payment thereunder,
no reason occurs why the common law remedy should not be available against the commissioner. In the case of property taxes, at
least on the question of overvaluation, a special reason exists for
concluding that the statutory procedure is exclusive. The stat.
ute itself provides that if any person fails to apply for relief at
the meeting of the county court, sitting for the purpose of reviewing and equalizing the assessments, he shall have waived his right
to ask for correction in his assessment list for the current year,
and shall not thereafter be permitted to question the correctness
of the list, except on appeal to the circuit court. This has been
called a sort of statutory estoppel."' It accords with the general
rule elsewhere on overvaluation." 86 As to questions of classification and taxability of property, with which the county court may
not deal, 1 7 the matter is not so clear. The statute provides that if
a taxpayer is dissatisfied with the classification of property, or
believes it to be exempt, he shall file his objections in writing with
the assessor, and request a ruling from the tax commissioner, or
may apply to the circuit court for relief, with right of appeal to
the supreme court."' By reason of the word "shall" the statute
may be considered to constitute resort to this remedy mandatory.
But there is no similar provision in this section purporting to bind
the taxpayer if he does not so act, as in the section dealing with
overvaluation before the county court. One possible view is that,
on a question of taxability of property, the defect is jurisdictional, and if the tax is paid under compulsion, the common law
remedy would be available. 119
113 W. VA. CoDE ANN. (Michie, Supp. 1933) c. 11, art. 3, § 24.
"14 W. Va. Acts 1935, H. B. No. 441, §§ 53, 54.
115 Supra n. 113; of. as to refusal of injunction for failure to proceed before
old board of review and equalization, now superseded by county court in this
function, W. Va. Nat. Bk. v. Spencer, 71 W. Va. 678, 683, 77 S. E. 269 (1913);
Pardee Lumber Co. v. Rose, 87 W. Va. 484, 488-9, 105 S. E. 792 (1921).
116 3 CooLEY, TAxATIoN

§

1278.

117 Supra n. 113.

"sW. VA. CODE. ANTN. (Michie, Supp. 1933) c. 11, art. 3, §§ 24A, 25.
119 Supra n. 110. See also Pardee Lumber Co. v. Rose, supra n. 115: 1 Wheroe
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In the federal courts the matter is much clearer. In Intertational Paper Co. v. Burrill,120 the court stated feelingly that,
except as modified by federal statute, the common law right of
action for money had and received lies against a tax collector to
recover taxes illegally collected, and paid under protest and under
implied duress arising from the drastic penalties provided in the
taxing statutes, and that no state law could bar the right of citizens of other states to utilize common-law remedies in the federal
courts. In an early decision,12' another federal court held that,
as to a question of taxability of personal property, the non-ownership of certain cattle, the defect was jurisdictional, and that illegal taxes were recoverable in a common law action against the
collector. The action was not barred by the existence of a remedy
before the statutory board for correcting the tax. The assessor
had made the return himself without demanding one from the
taxpayer as required by law, and then payment of the tax, as
wrongly assessed, was coerced under protest.
Most statutory proceedings are limited in point of time. 21
One possible advantage of the common law action against the collecting officer lies in its availability over a longer period of time.
Thus, in the Burril case' 23 the tax was admittedly illegal, having
the defect in the assessment is jurisdictional the property owner does not lose
his rights by failing to appear before a board, or a court sitting as a ministerial officer for remedial action."
120 Supra n. 101.

121 Supra n. 110.
122 W. VA. CODE ANN. (Michie, Supp. 1933) c. 11, art. 3,

§§ 24, 25 (property
taxes as to valuation, at the July meeting of the county court and within
thirty days after adjournment of county court appeal to circuit court; as to
classification and taxability, application to circuit court within thirty days
after adjournment of county court) ; ibid. c. 11, art. 3, § 27 (property taxes,
correction of mistake or clerical error by county court on application within
one year after property books are delivered to sheriff) ; ibid. c. 11, art. 8, § 18
(property tax levies, writ of supersedeas by circuit court within forty days
after order for levy); ibid. c. 11, art. 13, § 8 (business and occupation tax,
application to board of public works within thirty days after notice of assessment mailed by tax commissioner; action against tax commissioner in circuit
court, apparently no time limit) ; ibid. c. 11, art. 13A, § 11 (chain store tax,
no time limit other than any applicable statute of limitations); W. VA. CODE
ANN. (Michie, 1932) c. 11, art. 6, §§ 11, 12 (property tax assessments of public
service corporation, appeal to circuit court from board of public works within
thirty days after notice of assessment is deposited); ibid. c. 11, art. 11, § 21
(inheritance and transfer taxes, appeal to circuit court within thirty days after
notice of assessment forwarded); ibid. c. 11, art. 12, §§ 19, 20 (state license
taxes, appeal to circuit court from decision of tax commissioner within thirty
days); ibid. c. 11, art. 12, § 68 (corporate license taxes, application to board of
public works, no time limit apparently); ibid. c. 11, art. 14, §§ 19, 20 (gasoline
tax refunds for specific grounds, application to tax commissioner within thirty
or sixty days).
123 Supra n. 70.
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been. held unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of the United
States. 24 The plaintiff had previously Mfied his petition to recover the tax in the state court, but it was dismissed without
prejudice for failure to obtain service within six months after payment. The taxpayer then brought his action in the federal court,
where it was pointed out that at the time there was no legal remedy
available in the state court. It has been held in West Virginia
that a demand for money had and received is barred by the five
year statute of limitations, and that the time begins to run on the
receipt of the money by the defendant. 25 This rule would gov126
ern any action in the federal courts.
The West Virginia court has taken a liberal attitude on the
question of compulsory payment generally. 2 7 Duress or compulsion is a question of fact, often depending in tax cases on statutory provisions in aid of collection. Any satisfactory discussion
would be too lengthy for treatment here. 28 In some West Virginia statutes provisions exist which could amount to implied
duress."29 On the other *hand, the inheritance and transfer tax
law seems to make ample provision for safeguarding the interest
of the taxpayer.2 0 An appeal is allowed to the circuit court within thirty days after the tax commissioner's assessment and before
payment, and "until the same shall have been heard and decided,
proceedings for the collection of such taxes may be stayed by
order of such court for good cause shown, and upon such conditions as it may direct." Failure to pay the tax within six months
after the decedent's death is followed by the imposition of a ten
per cent penalty in addition to carrying interest of ten per cent
24 International Paper Co. v. Mass., 246 U. S. 135, 38 S. Ct. 292 (1918).
125W. VA. CODE AwN. (Michie, 1932) c. 55, art. 2, § 6; Jackson v. Hough,
38 W. Va. 236, 18 S. E. 575 (1893); 3 COOL=, TAzATIoN § 1304, and cases

cited.

1262 Cyc. FED. PROCEDUE, § 412.
127W. Va. Transp. Co. v.
128 3 CooI=r, TAXATiON, §

Sweetzer, 25 W. Va. 434 (1885).
1238 et seq.; Benzolene Motor Fuel Co. v. Bollinger, 353 IRI. 556, 187 N. E. 656 (1933) (virtual or moral duress in payment of taxes); Note (1934) 11 N. Y. U. L. Q. RLv. 662-3.

12 W. VA. CODE AN. (Michie, 1932) c. 11, art. 14, §§ 13, 15, 18 (gasoline
tax, failure or refusal to pay tax for any month within ten days after demand
by tax commissioner, empowers commissioner to cancel licenses to operate stations and distributing plants; automatic accrual of penalty equal to one-half
cent per gallon sold, used, or purchased during month, or not less than $25.00;
provision for distraint and sale by tax commissioner). W. VA. CODE ANN.
(Michie, Supp. 1933) c. 11, art. 13A, § 9 (chain store tax, violation of provisions a misdemeanor, fine on conviction of from $25.00 to $100.00 for each
day of continued unlicensed operation).
2- W. VA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1932) c. 11, art. 11, § 21.
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computed from the date of death. If the circuit court may suspend these provisions under its statutory authority pending the
determination of the controversy, there would seem to be no occasion for an involuntary payment.
The federal courts have taken a very practical view as to
what constitutes implied duress,' 3 probably attributable to the
influence of a statement by Mr. Justice Holmes that "courts
sometimes, perhaps, have been a little too slow to recognize the
32
The doctrine
implied duress under which payment is made.'
has been applied wherever. the self-executing provisions of a tax133
or mequire a discontinuance
ing act impose onerous penalties,
tax.3 4 This may be so, even
of
the
non-payment
of business on the
if the state is required to collect the tax by action, giving the taxpayer an opportunity to defend, when these other factors exist
which place the taxpayer at a disadvantage unless he pays prompt35
ly on demand and then sues to recover the payment.
B.

Injunctive Relief against Payment into the Treasury and
Decree for Return of Money to Taxpayer

When the legislature of West Virginia passed the chain store
tax act of 1933,13 it raised a host of inquiries, not the least perplexing of which were procedural questions involved in suits for
injunctive relief in a federal court. After an exhaustive examination of all the statutes, a statutory district court of three judges,
speaking through Judge Soper, concluded that the existence of an
ote (1924) 11 VA. L. REV. 134, 138; International Paper Co. v. Burrill,
'3
supra n. 70; Atchinson, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. O'Connor, 223 U. S. 280, 286,
32 S.Ct. 216 (1912); Gear, Scott & Co. v. Shannon, 223 U. S.468, 32 S. Ct.
236 (1912). The doctrine has also received the approval of some state courts;
Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 92 Conn. 199, 102 Atl. 600 (1917);
Ratterman v. Amer. Exp. Co., 49 Oh. St. 608, 32 N. E. 734 (1892); City of
San Antonio v. Grayburg Oil Co., 259 S. W. 985 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924); Nat.
Metal Edge Box Co. v. Beadsboro, 94 Vt. 405, 111 Atl. 386 (1920); 'hyte v.
State, 110 Cal. App. 314, 294 Pac. 417 (1930).
1 2Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry.Co. v. O'Connor, supra n. 131, at 223 U. S. 286.
1333 COOLEY, TAxATION, § 1286; Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. O'Connor,
supra n. 131; International Paper Co. v. Burrill, supra n. 70. Contra: Phillips
v. City of Portsmouth, 115 Va. 180, 194, 78 S.E. 651 (1913).
S.22, 29, 4
'3 3 COOLEY, TAXATION, § 1288; Swift & Co. v. U. S., 111 U.
S. Ct. 244 (1884); Atchison, T. & S. F. By. Co. v. O'Connor, supra n. 131;
Gaar, Scott & Co. v. Shannon, supra n. 131.
But where the
'35 Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. O'Connor, sufpa n. 131.
state must sue to collect the tax and there is no power of distraint or other
extenuating circumstance, the taxpayer is fully protected by setting up his
defense in the state's action to collect. Copper Co. v. Scherr, 50O . Va. 533,
539, 40 S.E. 514 (1901).
e.11, art. 13A.
IN W. VA. CODE ANN. (Michie, Supp. 1933)
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adequate legal remedy in West Virginia was so much a matter of
doubt that the right to proceed in federal equity must be recognized. 3 ' The Supreme Court of the United States approved this
holding. 8'
Injunctions against the collection of taxes have been disfavored generally because of the havoc they are supposed to play
with the fiscal system of the government.'
Where a whole levy
is affected,140 or the validity of an entire taxing act is drawn into
question, this possibility certainly exists. But the West Virginia
court has said that, while ordinarily equity will not interfere with
the taxing power of the state, where the assessment is wholly
void, and the public revenue is affected by the proceeding only to
the extent of the illegal tax, equity will not hesitate to enjoin collection.' 4 1 The fact that there is no uniform statutory rule
against such injunctions in this state may be indicative of a policy.
The chain store tax act forbids the issuance of an injunction
against collection in the state courts, 1 2 but other taxing acts are
either silent, 43 or expressly grant the right with or without condition. 4 4 There is conflict as to whether a statute authorizing
37

Standard Oil Co. v. Fox, supra n. 8.
138 Fox v. Standard Oil Co., at 79 L. ed. 342, saying: "The court decided,
after a careful review of the West Virginia statutes, that there was an imporfeet remedy at law which made permissible resort to equity. In that conclusion we concur."1
139 4 COOLEY, TAx.ATION, §§ 1640, 1654.
140 Ibid. § 1640.
141 Clarksburg Northern R. Co. v. Morris, 76 W. Va. 777, 782, 86 S. E. 893
(1916).
142 W. VA. CODE ANN. (Michie, Supp. 1933) c. 11, art. 13A, § 11.
'43 E.g., W. VA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1932) c. 11, art. 12, § 67 et. seg. (corporate charter and license tax); ibid. c. 11, art. 14 (gasoline tax); W. VA.
CODE ANN. (Michie, Supp. 1933) c. 11, art. 12, § 95 et seq. (non-intoxicating
beer tax); ibid. c. 11, art. 12A (privilege tax on carrier corporations): W.
Va. Acts 1935, H. B. No. 441 (personal net income tax).
14W.
VA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1932) c. 11, art. 6, § 17 (property tax assessment of public service corporations: "No injunction shall be awarded by
any court or judge to restrain the collection of the taxes, or any part of them,
so assessed upon the property of such owner or operator, except upon the
ground that the assessment thereof was in violation of the Constitution of the
United States, or of this State; or that the same was fraudulently assessed,
or that, there was a mistake made by the auditor in the amount of taxes properly chargeable on the property of such owner or operator; and in the latter
case no such injunction shall be awarded unless application be first made to
the auditor to correct the mistake claimed, and the auditor shall refuse to do
so, which fact shall be stated in the bill, nor unless the complainant pay into
the treasury of the State all taxes appearing by the bill of complaint to be
owing"); W. VA. CODE ANN. (Michie, Supp. 1933) c. 11, art. 13) § 8 (business and occupation taxes, same provision as to injunction as above quoted) ;
W. VA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1932) c. 11, art. 11, § 21 (inheritance and transfer
tax, provision that circuit court may stay proceedings for collection on appeal
1
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injunctive relief in the state courts creates a right cognizable in
the federal courts."' There is unanimity on the proposition that
state statutes forbidding injunctive relief in tax cases cannot control the right to such relief in the federal courts.'" To preclude
that relief the legal remedy on the law side of the federal court
must be plain, adequate, and complete." 7
The federal courts subscribe to the view that they should be
1 48
slow to grant injunctions against the collection of state taxes,
and follow the rule that equitable jurisdiction does not attach simply because the exaction is illegal and void, but that the taxpayer
must show additionally some acknowledged head of equity purlsdiction, 49 such as prevention of multiplicity of suits,15 removal
of clouds from title to property, or relief against threatened irreparable injury. The rule in the West Virginia courts is not
clear. In Copper Co. v. Seherr, 51' the court gave a strong statement of the rule obtaining in the federal courts; but the later case
of Turkey Knob Coal Co. v. Haflanan''2 has been cited'5 for the
contrary view that mere illegality is sufficient to warrant the interposition of equity. Incidentally, it has been held here than an
injunction will not be granted against a voidable assessment since
the statutory remedy is complete and ample.0 4 In such case of
overvaluation, resort to the statutory procedure for correcting
from tax commissioner's assessment "for good cause shown, and upon such
conditions as it may direct").
145 The following decisions hold that when the state statute specifically authorizes an injunction against collection, the federal courts will grant the same
relief even though the legal remedy be adequate. Cummings v. Nat. Bank, 101
U. S. 153, 25 L. ed. 903 (1879) : Grether v. Wright, 75 Fed. 742 (C. C. A. 6th,
1896); Brinkerhoff v. Brumfield, 94 Fed. 422 (C. C. N. D. Ohio, 1899). But
see Henrietta Mills v. Rutherford County, 281 U. S. 121, 50 S. Ct. 270 (1930);
Note (1934) 19 CORN. L. Q. 607, 608.
140 In re Tyler, 149 U. S. 164, 189, 13 S. Ct. 785 (1893); Standard Oil Co.
v. Howe, 257 Fed. 481 (C. C. A. 9th, 1919).
147 28 U. S. C. A. (1926) § 384. The test is the presence or absence of an
adequate remedy at law in the federal, not the state, courts. National Surety
Co. v. State Bank of Humboldt, 120 Fed. 593 (C. C. A. 8th, 1903); Southern
Ry. Co. v. Query, 21 F. (2d) 333 (E. D. S. C. 1927).
148 Rowley v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 66 F. (2d) 527 (C. C. A. 10th, 1934).
149 4 COOLEY, TAXATION, § 1641; Note (1934) 19 COFN. L. Q. 607, 608;
Arkansas Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Madden, 175 U. S. 269, 20 S. Ct. 119 (1899) ;
Pittsburgh, etc., Ry. Co. v. Bd. of Pub. Works of W. Va., 172 U. S. 32, 19

S. Ct. 90 (1898).

150 See critical discussion of this ground of intervention by federal courts,
Note (1934) 19 CoRN. L. Q. 607.
'5' 50 W. Va. 533, 40 S. E. 514 (1902); see also Williams v. Grant County
Court, 26 W. Va. 488 (1885).
152 84 W. Va. 402, 99 S. B. 849 (1919).
15 4 COOLLY, TAXATION, 3299.
154 In re Masonic Temple Society, 90 W. Va. 441, 111 S. E. 637 (1922).
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the assessment is essential before seeking relief by injunction, and
neglect or failure to do so ends the matter. 1
Injunctions against collection are amply discussed elsewhere. 5 8 While the controlling legal rules are much the same, the
purpose here is to focus attention on the type of injunctive and
incidental relief involved in the chain store tax litigation, namely,
to prevent payment over to the treasury by the tax commissioner
on the ground of threatened irreparable injury and to compel the
return of the identical funds, earmarked by payment under protest. Two grocery chains brought such suits in the courts of the
state; four oil companies filed their complaints in the federal
court.
In Standard Oil Co. v. Fox'57 a temporary restraining order
was granted just one day before the date on which the tax commissioner had declared his intention to turn over to the treasury
all the collections for the month, including moneys paid under
protest. On the application for an interlocutory and permanent
injunction and for a decree of refund, the court said :11s
"The right of the plaintiff to invoke the equitable jurisdiction of the court depends upon the absence of an adequate
remedy at law. A suit to enjoin the collection of a state tax
on the ground that it involves an arbitrary and unreasonable
discrimination against the taxpayer in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment will not lie in a federal court when, under
the laws of the state, provision is made for the payment of the
tax under protest with the right to bring suit for its recovery
against the collecting officer or authority, and when means are
provided for the satisfaction of any judgment that may be
obtained."
The clourt had reference to the type of statutory provision appearing in Henrietta Mills v. Rutherford County,' " which authorized
payment under protest and demand in writing for refund within
thirty days after payment, suit against the county, city or town
involved if not refunded within ninety days, and payment of any
such judgment with interest by the state treasurer; or that considered in Atchison T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. O'Connor,' providing
155 Pardee Lumber Co. v.
Harshbarger, 73 W. Va. 397,
cer, supra n. 115.
1i 4 COOLLY, TAxATION, §
157 Supra n. 8.
158 Ibid. at 497.
1359Supra n. 145, at 281 U.
380 Supra n. 131, at 223 U.

Rose, supra n. 115; Island Creek Fuel Co. v.
80 S. E. 504 (1913); W. Va. Nat. Bk. v. Spen1640 et seg.; Note (1934) 19 CoRX. L. Q. 607.
S. 124-5.
S. 287.
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that, if it should be determined in any action at law or equity that
the tax had been erroneously paid, upon the filing of a certified
copy of the judgment the auditor might draw a warrant on the
treasurer for the refunding of the tax. The chain store tax statute was not so explicit, but if it had provided specifically for
payment out of the treasury the question of the constitutionality
of the procedure would immediately arise.'
Having made the statement of principle, the court proceeded
to a detailed analysis of the situation in West Virginia, including
a review of all the remedies suggested as adequate by counsel for
the tax commissioner and a review of the financial condition of the
state government. 162 One cannot fail to note in the court's approach a real disposition to proceed charily, not a mere profession
of reluctance against awarding injunctive relief in a state tax
The court considered fully the statute which
controversy. 63
seemed to have the closest relevancy to the inquiry, the so-called
"pecuniary claims" statute. 6 " This provides that where the
auditor disallows a claim in whole or in part, a petition may be
filed before the Circuit Court of Kanawha County for auditing
and adjusting the claim, subject to a five year limitation period
165
Claims
form the time "the claim might have been asserted."'
assertable under this provision cannot be presented directly to the
legislature by petition without a copy of the proceedings before'
6T
that this is
the circuit court.'66 It has been declared judicially
merely a statutory proceeding for auditing a claim against the
state (following precisely the language of the statute) ; that even
after the claim has been audited by the circuit court, it must pass
through the legislature before it can be paid,'68 and even there the
appropriation may be contested.
101 Supra notes 19, 20, 85.
162

Supra n. 157, at 498-500.

The Supreme Court noted the fact that the district court reviewed the
situation carefully, see supra n. 138. A recent discussion of the case seems
to intimate unjustifiably that the district court acted simply because some
"slight doubt" existed as to the availability of 'an adequate legal remedy.
Note (1934) 19 CoRN. L. Q. 607, 609. This doubt was substantial; it is a
serious question whether the state court could have so construed the existing
statutes as to provide such legal remedy.
164W. VA. CODE Am-N. (Miehie, 1932) c; 12, art. 3, § 1; e.14, art. 2, § 1.
VA. CODE ANx. (Michie, 1932) c. 14, art. 2, § 5.
165WlW.
W. VA. CODE ANN. (Micbie, 1932) c.12, art. 3, § 3.
66W
163

Robinson v. LaFollette, supra n. 14.
ANN. (Michie, 1932) c. 14, art. 2, § 3, provides that the
auditor shall report the circuit court's action at the next following session
of the legislature and that "no such claim shall be paid until an appropriation shall be made therefor by the legislature." It has been held under a
167

168W . VA. CODE
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There are no court decisions indicating whether or not this
auditing procedure is available for the refunding and recovery
of tax moneys, particularly where the claim involves a judicial
controversy as to illegality or unconstitutionality. Under the prevailing federal doctrine, the court in the Standard Oil case 0 9 had
only to conclude that the matter was doubtful.'" In Robinson 'v.
LaFollettel7' the claim was for compensation on account of services
rendered by a shorthand reporter in a felony prosecution by the
state. Regardless of the original intention respecting the use of
this procedure for asserting tax claims, there seem to be nothing
in its inherent nature to prevent the courts from attributing such
scope to the statute. As the determination thereunder is merely
advisory to the legislature, the constitutional provision for the immun!ity of the state does not apply. It was argued, however, in
the Standard Oil case1 72 that the previously discussed blanket appropriation provisions, coupled with the auditing procedure, constituted the intended legal remedy for the taxpayer in this state.
It is doubtful whether these appropriations for "overpayments"
and "erroneous payments" were ever intended to cover the refunding of moneys intentionally paid under protest and under a
claim of illegality or unconstitutionality. 7 3 Even if these approsimilar provision in Virginia that the legislature cannot be compelled to mako
this appropriation. Smith v. State Highway Commission, 131 Va. 571, 109
S. E. 312 (1921). The determination of the court simply establishes the demand. A special appropriation is necessary before payment. Stuart v.
Sinking Fund Com'rs, 123 Va. 231, 96 S. E. 241 (1918).
l9 Supra n. 8.
170

Equitable jurisdiction attaches in the federal courts when the existence

of an adequate legal remedy is not clear, but debatable and uncertain. 4
CooLEY, TAxATION, § 1662; Standard Oil Co. v. Fox, supra n. 8, at 498;
Union P. R. Co. v. Bd. of Com'rs of Weld County, supra n. 105; Wallace v.
Hines, 253 U. S. 66, 68, 40 S. Ct. 435 (1920); Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v.
Doughton, 262 U. S. 413, 43 S. Ct. 620 (1923). If the state court has clearly
interpreted and approved the legal remedy provided by statute, it will be
deemed adequate in the absence of special circumstances. Mathews v. Rodgers, 284 U. S. 521, 52 S. Ct. 217 (1932) ; Stratton v. St. Louis S. W. Ry. Co.,
284 U. S. 530, 52 S. Ct. 222 (1932). The taxpayer is not required to speculate
and take his chances of being able to recover at law, Nutt v. Ellerbe, 56 F.
(2d) 1058 (E. D. S. C. 1932), as was the case in Spring Valley Coal Co: v.
State, 198 Il1. 620, 154 N..E. 380 (1926), where the taxpayer was turned out
of the state courts empty-handed because the statutes did not cover his case,
although he had previously been refused an injunction against collection in
the federal court on the ground that the statutory provision permitted recovery in the state courts. See Field, op. cit. supra n. 100, at 505.
171

Supra n. 14.

372 Supra n. 8, at 498.
172Supra n. 8, at 500.

A tax "intentionally and understandingly paid"
paid, although unlawfully collected. Security Bank
is not "erroneously"
v. Twinde, 52 S. D. 352, 217 N. W. 542 (1928), appeal dismissed, 278 U. S.

569, 49 S. Ct. 81 (1Q28).
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priation provisions should be so construed by the courts as to
supply the funds to satisfy an administrative determination of
1 74
it
tax claims, where such determination has been authorized,
is impossible to accept the view that the auditing statute does not
require the presentation of the specific claim for legislative consideration.1 . 7 If a tax claim were presented to the Circuit Court
of Kanawha County on the theory that it need not be reported to
the legislature, it would conflict with the constitution, because it
would involve a judicial determination to be satisfied from public funds. In any event, the statutory auditing procedure is confined to a particular state court, and cannot be deemed to afford
an adequate legal remedy in the federal courts"76 The district
court did not attempt to interpret the constitutional provision,
but passed to the practical consideration of the availability of funds
to meet the substantial claims involved, assuming the existence of
some legal remedy for presenting the same.
It was demonstrated that the amounts involved were so large
that it was questionable whether either the tax commissioner or
the state. could satisfy the sizeable claims on demand at that
troublesome period in the readjustment of the state's tax system to
meet the requirements of the tax limitation amendment. Thus,
the case fitted into the category of irreparable injury, an independent head of equity jurisdiction, as required by the federal
rule in tax cases. The court cited a line of decisions 77 commeneing with an opinion by Chief Justice Marshall and wrote a classic
summation of the controlling doctrine which has been crystallizing inconspicuously through the years :178
"We think, therefore, that no adequate legal remedy has
been afforded the plaintiff in this case, for it is established beyond controversy in the field of state taxation that the mere
ability to obtain a fruitless judgment will not defeat the equitable jurisdiction."
The court also cited ample authority for the proposition that
174 W. VA. CODE ANN. (Michie, Supp. 1033) c. 11, art. 13, § 8 (business
and occupation taxes, provision for review by board of public works).
175 See n. 168, supra.
176 4 COOLLY, TAxATiON, § 1662; Nevada-California Power Co. v. Hamilton,
235 Fed. 317, 339 (D. C. Nev. 1916); City Bank Farmers' Trust Co. v.
Schnader, 291 U. S. 24, 29, 54 S. Ct. 259 (1934).
177 See, generally, 4 PomEROY, EQuITY JUBIsPraUDENcOE (4th ed. 1919) §
1805; 4 COOLLY, TAXATioN § 1641; Note (1932) 32 COL. L. REv. 688, 692-3;
Note (1932) 41 YALE L. J. 769; Lockwood, Maw and Rosenberry, op. cit.
supra n. 9, at 435-6.
178 Standard Oil Co. v. Fox, supra n. 8, at 500.
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once equitable jurisdiction attaches, if the tax money was improperly collected, the collecting officer can be required to account for
79
and return the money to the taxpayer.'
It may be that section eleven of the chain store tax act was
intended to give much the same remedy that was actually sanctioned by the federal court. The section merely forbids an injunction against collection, and, as previously noted, its wording suggests an intention that the taxpayer should recover the identical
funds paid under protest "by an appropriate remedy as provided
by law." If the tax commissioner is not required plainly to hold
such moneys pending the determination of the controversy, and in
fact declares that he will not so retain it, the "appropriate
remedy" is necessarily an injunction against payment over to the
treasury and a decree for refund.
The court's concern that no other remedy might be available,
which would afford the taxpayer a means of actually receiving satisfaction of the claim, was not unfounded in view of what has
been pointed out here concerning the constitutional and statutory
restrictions existing in West Virginia. In modern statutes elsewhere dealing with the refunding of illegal or unconstitutional
taxes, there is almost uniformly some provision protecting the
taxpayer from the possible inability of the collector to respond
personally. These provisions are of three types. First, there is
the procedure leading to payment of public funds from the treasury,1'80 which involves constitutional difficulties here. There is
also the provision that the duty of the collecting officer to pay
over the moneys into the state treasury promptly be suspended
when "the delay has not been wilful or avoidable by the collector."1 s An express exoneration of this chaiacter would be a
distinct improvement over existing provisions in the various taxing statutes of this jurisdiction; however, it is so phrased that it
immediately requires construction. Finally, there is the type of
statutory provision which embodies exactly the relief sought and
granted by the lower court in the Standard O1l case. In Illinois,
179 Piedmont, etc., Ry. Co. v. Query, 56 F. (2d) 172 (E. D. S. C. 1932);
Greene v. Louisville & I. R. R. Co., 244 U. S. 499, 37 S. Ct. 673 (1917);
Atlantic Coast Line By. Co. v. Doughton, supra n.170; Tyler County v. Town,
23 P. (2d) 371 (C. C. A. 5th, 1928); Roadway Express, Inc. v. Murray, 60
F. (2d) 293, 297 (W. D. Okla. 1932).
1so See, e. g., Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry.Co. v. O'Connor, supra n.131, at 223
U. S.287.
is,1 Miss. CoDE ANx. (1930) §§ 3289, 3290; NE. CouP. STAT. (1929)
§§ 77-1923, 6018-19; OKLA. Coup. STAT. ANN. (Buin, 1921) §§ 9970-71.
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for example, the law provides expressly that the collecting officer
or agency shall hold for thirty days all moneys received for the
state under protest, and on expiration of that period deposit the
same with the state treasurer unless the taxpayer secures a temporary injunction restraining the making of the deposit until the
final order or decree of the court. 18 2 That state has the identical
constitutional provision regarding the state's immunity from action or suit 8 3 which is found in our own constitution, and the
Illinois Court has held that this very procedure does not violate
that immunity. 84 The distinction is between a proceeding for the
adjudication of a general claim to be satisfied from the public
funds in the state treasury, and one for specific money or property held by an individual acting as a state official under the color
of statutory authority in making the allegedely illegal or unconstitutional exaction. In the latter situation the state has no immediate interest in the subject matter of the controversy. If the
taxpayer prevails, the adjudication in such case will establish his
right to the return of certain specific moneys held by the officer. 8 '
Under the Illinois statute the taxpayer must not only pay
under protest, but must act affirmatively to prevent the payment
of the money into the state treasury. This extra burden on the
taxpayer should serve to some extent to curb any disposition to
dispute tax assessments without substantial grounds for making
the claim. At the same time, the procedure has the advantage over
the injunction against collection of requiring the payment of the
tax in every instance. It is the logical method for use in states
like West Virginia and Illinois, since it provides a certain means
of satisfying the taxpayer's claim without touching the treasury
and thus avoids the serious constitutionl question arising whenever
a statute purports to set up machinery for reaching funds in the
treasury.
182 ILL. REV. STAT. (Smith-Hurd, 1931) c. 127, par. 172; see O'Gara Coal Co.
v. Emmerson, 326 Ill. 18, 156 N. B. 814 (1927); Benzolene Motor Fuel Co.
v. BolUinger, supra n. 128.
183 Supra n. 11 and n. 12.
184 German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Van Cleave, 191 Ill. 410, 413, 61 N. E.
94 (1901); see in respect to analogous problem under Eleventh Amendment,
Tyler v. Dane, 289 Fed. 843 (W. D. Wis. 1923) writ of error dismissed per
stipulation 266 U. S. 637, 45 S. Ct. 10, 69 L. ed. 481 (1924).
185 For the view that payment under protest earmarks the moneys as trust
funds to be accounted for if the taxpayer prevails, see 3 CooLEY, TAxAT Io N
§ 1276; Shoemaker v. Grant County, 36 Ind. 175, 186 (1871); Atchison, T. &
S. F. By. Co. v. O'Conner, supra n. 131, at 223 U. S. 287; Ward v. Love
County, 253 U. S. 17, 40 S. Ct. 419 (1920); Standard Oil Co. v. Fox, supra
n. 8; Stewart Dry Goods Co. v. Lewis, 8 F. Supp. 396 (W. D. Ky. 1934).
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The legislature of West Virginia might well consider the advisability of adopting the Illinois type of procedure for general
use in asserting the illegality or unconstitutionality of tax impositions. This measure together with the new refunding statute 8 6 for use in clear cases of erroneous payments, would constitute a well-rounded system covering all classes of tax claims. The
argument that injunctive relief disrupts the state's revenue system loses a great deal of its force in a jurisdiction where payment
from the treasury is so difficult from a legal viewpoint, and no one
really wants to adopt the other alternative of subjecting the collecting officer to personal liability. Unless the constitution itself
is to be changed in this respect, some middle course should be
adopted. The Illinois procedure supplies the precedent which best
satisfies the various interests entitled to consideration: the taxpayer's right to a clear and certain method of recoving tax moneys,
the state's desire for as little interference as possible with the
revenue system, and the state's higher interest arising from the
constitutional provision for immunity from judicial proceedings
which seek to fasten financial liability directly upon it.
18r

Supra n. 57.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1935

37

